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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
rx 1 ,, Ens AL

c.1.T. CREDIT ,
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

HI CH ARD D. NELSON, and
JESSE E. NELSON, d/b/a HOLLADAY USED CARS, and RICHARD D. NELSON, and JESSE E.
N~~LSON, as individuals,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
10300

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Appellant is seeking to recover against the Re\pondent Jesse E. Nelson for the indebtedness incurred
!J)' the partnership, Holladay Used Cars, based on the
:heory that Respondent Jesse E. Nelson was a partner
ui tlie business with his son, Respondent Richard D.
x~ison.
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Appellant further contends that Respondeut .Je ,,
1
E. Nelson executed a peronal guarantee to t]1,. 1
.
" ·~PpeJ.
lant guaranteemg the payment of any' inrlelJt Cfl!Jt;,
i
that might be owed by Holladay Used Cars or Hr·.
spondent Richard D. Nelson.
·

DISPOSITION IN LO,V:ER COURT
The matter was set for trial, evidence and wit
nesses ·were heard by the Court, sitting without a jury
The Respondent Richard D. Nelson admitted that tlir
Appellant was entitled to a judgment against him on
all six of the causes of action set forth in the complaint
As to the Respondent Jesse E. Nelson the Court helrl
that there was not a partnership between the Respond·
ents and the documents obtained from the Respondent
Jesse E. Nelson were obtained by misrepresentation.
The complaint as it concerns Respondent Jesse E.
Nelson was dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks the reversal of the Order of Dis·
missal with prejudice of no cause of action as io Rt·
spondent Jesse E. Nelson.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a consumer finance concern that is 1l1
the business of financing automobile dealers at botli

4

ksale and retail level. Respondent Richard D.
\Liiun was actively engaged in selling used cars under
; f name of Holladay Used Cars, in Salt Lake County,
11
l'tah It was represented to l\clr. Don Hawker, a sales
itiiresrntatiYe of the Appellant, by Respondent Rich:ir~l D. Nelson that Respondent Jesse E. Nelson was
npartnership with him, although his father would not
an active part in the business in that he was emriloyed with another automobile concern.
, , J10
1 1

These representations were made to l\Ir. Don
Hall'ker in June or July of 1962 when he contacted
he Respondent Richard D. Nelson to solicit the Holioday l:sed Cars' finance business. Shortly thereafter,
Jlr. Hawker contacted the Respondent Jesse E. Nelson
and informed him of the discussions with his son conttrning establishing credit lines to Holladay Used Cars.
'!
Respondeut .Jesse E. Nelson was told on this occasion
I ':hat a personal financial statement would be required
I 1connection with his association with Holladay Used
! Lars . .:\Ir. Hawker asked whether or not he was a parti 11n of Holladay Used Cars, and Respondent Jesse E.
\elson admitted he was. A couple of days later, Mr.
! Hmker called upon the Respondent Jesse E. Nelson
'nsecure his personal financial statement on the Appel\ !ant's form (Exhibit 5-P). On this same occasion, it was
I >lr. Hawker's best recollection that Respondent Jesse
I L \ elson executed Appellant's personal guarantee
11
J
Jrm. HoweYer, subsequent developments indicate this
j :iiuantee neYer did reach the Appellant's credit de1 µartnwnt.
1

I

I
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I

The Appellant's applications and forms (F',x·1JH4
··.
1-P through 3-P) were executed on behalf of Ii< ),I]..11 1~·
Used Cars by Richard D. Nelson, as partner.
'
The Appellant's credit department in Sealtlt,
\\T ashington, in a routine investigation found that tht
customary guarantee form was absent from the Hniladay Used Car file. Mr. Hawker was requested hi
the Appellant to secure the missing form. On Februur;
26, 1963, Mr. Hawker contacted Respondent Jesse~:
Nelson and secured the guarantee (Exhibit l!H\
Respondent Jesse E. Nelson read the guarantee and
the contents of it was explained to him; he under·
stood he was personally guaranteeing Holladay Use1l
Cars and Respondent Richard D. Nelson. A copy ril
said guarantee was given to Respondent Jesse E. Nelson. During this visit there was conversation by Mr.
IIawker to the effect that the Holladay Used Car
business was doing fine. The evidence is not clenr a)
to whether or not this conversation took place before
or after the execution of the guarantee.
During July 1962 and through March 1DG3 lhr
Appellant was floorplanning the motor vehicles fn
Holladay Used Cars. It was the practice during 1:1i
period of time for Respondent Richard D. Nelson (,,
appear at the Appellant's place of business and sec11rr
the title of the motor vehicle in exchange for n Hol
laday Used Cars bank check in the amount of the indehi·
edness of the motor vehicle.
1

1

Approximately two weeks after the execution
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iii

guarantee and particularly on ~larch
1 ~ 11){;:1, the Appellant was informed by its bank that
, rcr:d of the Holladay Used Cars bank cheks were
1
,
, " clearing the bank and being returned to the Appel11
: hnt'i bauk with the annotation "Refer to l\1aker." It
.,, 11 determined that the returned checks had amountecl
approximately $12,000.00 and within a week this
,Jehtedness grew to approximately $19,000.00 in in111
,11fficirnt funds checks. Demand was made by the
lppellant on both Respondents to pay the sum of the
niiebltdness and both ref used.
11

, ,puiH!ents'

i•l

: ,
1

:1TATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
THE TlUAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR
\\HE~ IT FOUND THAT THE RESPONDEXT JESSE E. NELSON '"AS NOT A PART~EH WITH HIS RESPONDENT SON IN
IIOLLADA Y USED CARS.

ARGU.MENT
In reYiewing the facts before us by examining the
e~onl and the exhibits, we find that on the initial con:('( b~· ~Ir. Hawker of the Appellant corporation with
l\c1pnndent Richard D. Nelson that he represented
'li:ii Iii, father would be associated with Holladay Used
l:ii\ as a partner.
Shortly thereafter .l\Ir. Hawker
7

called upon Respondent Jesse E. Nelson and ai ,. ,
if he was a partner in llolladav
Used ('-"
L:
him
•
•
<ll s :l!1i[
said he was. (Tr. p. 24, 1. 21). He was also adriserl
that be would have to furnish personal financial inf111
ma ti on and Respondent Jesse E. Nelson said lie II.OIL:,1.1
be happy to do so (Tr. p. 24 1. 27).
Respondent Jesse E. Nelson submitted to the
Appellant his financial statement with his signalun
on a form provided by the Appellant (Exhibit j.l\
Under the law a person is bound to know the content,
of any written instrument which he signs and he 1,
bound by the terms and provisions thereof.
In applying for Appellant's floorplan accon11n11
dations and submitting other customary forms sup·
plied by the Appellant the Respondent Richard D.
Nelson executed the documents as a partner (Exhibill
1-P through 3-P).
The exhibits and direct conversational contacts ll'itl1
the Respondents establish the fact that the Respomlenh
represented to the Appellant that they were partne11
in Holladay Used Cars.
It might be true that an actual partnership clii!
not exist as between the Respondents but as to thin;
persons, a partnership liability may be predicted uni
only upon the fact of the actual creation of a partner·
ship relation between the parties by their contrad vr
agreement to become partners, but also upon the con
duct and dealings of the parties under circumstanc-ri
· re1ation whcll
creating the appearance o f a partners lup
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;tdual eoutractual undertaking which would
, ate :1•; bct\\'ec11 the parties themselves the status of
1 : 1 rfw:r~liip, and eyen though they may have expressed
, r iu it'n t io11, unknown to such third persons, not to
11 1
;, 101 ne partuers. 1 t may be sufficient that by their
iti1dud tltc parties appear to become partners. See
!ii ,\m .Tur, Partnership, Sel'.tion 71.
·,re i1 no

j

The t'niJ'orm Partnership Act provides that where
per~o11, by words spoken or written, or by conduct,
:q1rrsu1h himself or consents to another's representing
;11111 to anyone as a partner in an existing partnership,
, r 11itli 011e or more persons not actually partners, he
,Ji:1hlc to a11y such person to whom such representation
1:11 liee11 made who has, on the faith of such represen::1ti1111. gi\·en credit to the actual or apparent partner,111p. The TT niform Act is substantially identical to
Sedion 48-1-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

:

1

The Uespo11dent Jesse E. Nelson became subject
ll1e liaLilities of partners ·with his son by knowingly
dm1iling fiuancial statements directed to the Appel:11

and was negligent in permitting his son to hold
:l:trnseh-es out as partners. The liability as a partner
,; a person who holds himself out as a partner, or
1wrmits others to do so, is predicated on the policy
1tlie law seeking to preYent frauds on those who lend
heir mm ie~· on the apparent credit of those who are
'di\ 01!1 as partners. Although persons mean not to
\1:1rt11ers :it all, and are not partners inter sese, they
111' parl11ers notwithstanding, as to third persons.
h1il

I

II
I

1

I
II

' I

11

I

I

1
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This liability as partners may arise contntr",l t 0 ti.1Cl
own intentions. The question is not what the .. .
pa1 1It•
intended by their contract, but whether third re1s11i1.,
n , , , ·.'
had a right to rely on their joint credit.
·
1'

The Appellant exercised due diliaence
.1 ., ,
1·n '.\Ct!·
b
taining the facts and had reasonable grounds for belier.
ing that Respondent Jesse E. Nelson was a partner
In Buehner Block Company vs. Glezos, ti Utali
2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517, this Court reyiewed the f:icl\
to determine whether the evidence supported the find·
ing of a partnership. It was held that all of the facb
combined to provide ample basis for the finding of a
partnership to a creditor eyen though, as between tlic
individuals, no real partnership existed. The facts before
this Court in our case more than abundantly support
the fact that Respondent Jesse E. Nelson was a partner
in that .M.r. Hawker confronted him and examined him
as to whether or not he was a partner during their first
meeting in July of 1962.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COl\I.MITTED ERROR
VVHEN I'f FOUND THAT THE APPELLANT
HAD KNO,VLEDGE OF THE INSUFFICIENT FUNDS CHECKS AND "\VAS AW 1\HE
OF THE INDEBTEDNESS OF HOLLAD,\Y
USED CARS "TI-IEN THE PERSONAL Gl"AH·
ANTEE OF RESPONDENT JESSE E. NEL
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i:S '.\'/,~ J1,XEC'UTED AND FINDING SAID
c,I . \ t'i.L'\TEE \VA.S OB'J'AINED BY l\IlS,U'rrn:,EXTATION.

ARGUl\iENT
:1,Ir. Hawker testified that it was the best of his
1011 that Respondent Jesse :E.. Nelson executed
1i:rsonal guarantee form at their first meeting in J aly
·]9!:l. However, subsequent developments indica(ed
I 11:1t it uerer got to . Appellant's credit department (Tr.

!11 ·.,)
1•

I' 2·1)
- .

1 0n Felmiarv 2(), 1 !W3, ~Ir. Hawker secured the
1 ·'.tonrl persona I guarantee ( Exlub1t 5-P).
It is the
Pi:spo11dents' eoutention that at the time the said guar1 ;,r1tec \\'as exeeuted that the Appellant had knowledge
! 'I the n<H1ceou11t checks and .Mr. Hawker's represen·hon to Respondent Jesse E. Nelson that the Holl\d Car business was doing fine was knowingly
or made recklessly ,_,_·ithout knowing the true facts.
1111 Trial Court agreed with this contention in dismiss! ,\ppellaut's complaint with no cause of action.

I

Jiiss Kathleen l\IcGraw, an employee of the Apduing February and l\larch of 1963, was the
11
1ployc"· in eliarge of taking bank checks from Re'!111ndtu\ Ril'li[lrd D. N elso11 and releasing the chattel
:1 nd de IiYering the motor vehicle titles. :Miss
tc~titicd from the .Appellant corporate records
the eliceks were receiYed and the dates the

11

titles were released. (Tr. p. 149 l. 7 through 150 I. lu
, ~ I,
All of the checks received and titles released "l ', '
' d l!Ci1
constitutes the Respondents' indebtedness, were released after .March 1, 1963. The transactions took pl ace
after the execution of the said personal guarantee. Surely the Appellant would not have continued to release
the motor vehicle titles if it had known that the Hul·
laday Used Car business was in extreme financial difficulty and had knowledge that their bank checks woulr!
not be honored. The record is completely void of am
evidence that the Appellant had knowledge of then~
spondents' financial difficulty on February 26, 1060.
In Brazee vs ..Morris, 68 Ariz. 224, 204 P.2d m.
it was held that fraud is never presumed nor can it be
found to exist, on a mere suspicion as to possibilitir,
thereof. Fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
The burden of proving fraud rests upon the Re·
spondents and the record is barren of any facts constituting fraud on the part of the Appellant.
It should be noted from the record (Tr. p. 103, I
7, p. llO 1. 19) that the conversation that took place
on February 26, 1963 between Mr. Hawker and Respondent Jesse E. Nelson at the time of the executiuu
of the said guarantee was of a general, time passing
conversation. There is some conflict of facts in the reeord
as to whether or not Mr. Hawker's remark that Holladay Used Car businss was doing fine was made bet'nrt
or after the execution of the said guarantee.
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Tl:is raises the issue of whether or not there was

Respondent Jesse E. Nelson upon the state. t ade b\· l\Ir. Hawker. It appears that Respondu1u 1 111
•
, fo~e E. Nelson relied upon the fact that his son
111
iiatl already signed the guarantee (Tr. p. 102 l. 21)
uid 11 ot upon the statement made by Mr. Hawker.
The comment made was of such a nature that it was
reasonably calculated to deceive Respondent Jesse
111
E. Xclson; it did not induce him to do that which other'W: lw mmld not have done.

,,li:ince IJ~·

1

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted by the Appellant that
'::c inwer Comt erred in dismissing the Appellant's
1111nplaint with no cause of action. The Court committed
:wo errors in order to reach its decisions to wit: finding
tl1it a partnership did not exist and finding the per'111111 guarantee was
secured by misrepresentation .
.\ppellant submits its case on the facts as disclosed by
i11" rernrd and the law applicable to the issues of this
1

rn1e,

Respectfully submitted,
ALAN D. FRANDSEN
Attorney for Plaintif and Appellant
366 South State Street

Salt Lake City, Utah
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